Roy James Barnhill dba Zions Furniture Upholstering v. Young Electric Sign Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
Roy James Barnhill dba Zions Furniture
Upholstering v. Young Electric Sign Company :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Stephen B. Nebeker; Attorneys for Respondent
Horace J. Knowlton; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co., No. 9591 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3971
'( .... 
- .. ) •.. 
IN THE SUPREME COUI\'1 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F ~ L E [ 
ROY JAMES BARNHILL, 
dba ZIONS FURNITURE 
y .J- 1962 
UPHOLSTERING, '"'' . L..dr~. upreme Court, Utah 
Plaintiff-Appellant J 
vs. 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
3rd District Court for Salt Lake County 
Hon. Aldan J. Anderson, Judge 
No. 
9591 
Horace J. Knowlton 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Stephen B. Nebeker of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Deseret Building 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
S'f.t\'rJ~::\IJ1:N'l., 011' 'l.,l-IE KIND OF CASE ____ 1 
DISPOSI'riOX IX I~O''rER COURT ____________ 2 
RELIEF SOlTGIIT ON APPEAL -------------------- 2 
S'f.t\. TE:\IEN'f OI~" F .r\.(ufS ---------------------------------- 2 
1.\ RG tT :\IE N 'r ___ _ __ __ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ ________ ____ __ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ ___ _____ _______ _ __ 3 
1. 'fhe case should ha Ye gone to the jury on the 
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
2. The trial court erred in refusing to submit the case 
to the jury on the question of Circumstantial 
Evidence. 
CASES CITED 
Busse Ys. :\lurray ~Ieat & Livestock Company, 
4<5 Utah 596 _______ . _______ . ___ . ___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ _ _ ______ _ _ _ 5 
James Ys. Robertson, 39 lJ. -t14 117 P. 1068 __________ 4 
Johnson vs. Silver King Consol. Mining Co. of 
Utah, 5-J. Utah 3-~ ------------------------------------------------ 7 
)loore YS. James~ 5 U 2nd 91, 297 P 2nd 221 ------------ 3 
:\lor by Ys. Rogers, 12:2 C. 54<0, 252 1~:2 231, 1953.. 7 
,,.,.ightman Ys. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
5 L~ tah 2nd 373, 302 P 2nd 471 ------------------------ 3 
TEXTS 
Corpus Juris Second urn, P 243 Page 1100 ------------ 8 
Am. J ur., 38, 993, Paragraph 297 -------------------------- 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ItO\'" J ~-\~IES BARNHILL, 
dba ZIOXS :F,URNI'fl~RE 
lTI> HOLS'l'ERING, 
Plaintiff-..:1 p Jlclla nt, 
vs. 
lTOlrXG ELE(~'l'lllC SIGN 
(~0)11> .t\NY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
9591 
ST..:\'fE)Il~~X'l' OF ~rHE J(IND OF CASE 
'fhis is an action for datnages to the plaintiff's 
business and goods eaused by the negligence of the 
defendant in the operation and repair of an electric sign 
over the building occupied by the plaintiff. 
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DISPOSI,-fiON IN LO,VER COURT 
'fhe case 'vas tried to a jury. From a directed ver-
dict in favor of the defendant, taking the case fron1 
the jury, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIE~~ SOUG-HT OX APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
rnent in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
Plaintiff operated the Zions Furniture lTpholster-
ing business at a place kno,vn as Parkin Junction, 
across the road from Slin1 Olson's Service Station in 
Bountiful, Ctah. in a building· over "·hich the defendant 
operated and rnaintained a large neon and electric sign. 
In the early n1orning of October 30th, 1959, during a 
high wind, the building, including the business and 
goods of the plaintiff, was completely destroyed by 
fire. The fire started on the roof of the building in the 
vicinity of the sign. .~. \ disturbance ""as observed in the 
sign at the tin1e a fire ""as seen on the roof of the building 
and before the fire had reached the inside of the build-
ing. 'fhe electric and neon sign "·as cornpletely within 
the control of the defendant, "\vhose workmen were on 
the roof of the building late the night before the fire, 
rnoving and repairing· parts of the sign. Each side of 
the sign 'vas fed b~,. 110 Yolts of electricity, which was 
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boosted by transforiners to a voltage as high as 16,000. 
})art of the sig·n \Vas dangling fro1n electric wires at a 
place \\·here the roof would have been. The plaintiff 
suffered da1nages iu the sum of approximately $25,500 
as a result of the fire. 
ARGUnlEN'l., 
Point 1. 'l,he case should have gone to the jury on 
the doctrine of Res Ipsa I~oquitur. 
'fhe neon and electric sign was an object of instru-
Ineutality wholly within the control of the defendant. 
(R. 16. 93 and 102). ~Joore vs. J a1nes, 5 U 2nd 91~ 
297 P ~nd ~~1. 
'l.,he fire started on the roof of the building in the 
vicinity of the sig·n. ~lr. lVIendenhall ( R. 33) a driver 
for the Greyhound Bus, drove past the building going 
north shortly before the building \Vas consumed and 
sa"· no fire on the inside of the building. He could not 
haYe seen a fire of the size described by Mr. Gayhart 
(R. 51) on the roof of the building because of the fire-
\vall and the slope of the roof. )lr. Gayhart, on the other 
hand, driving a Greyhound bus to"\vard the south, was 
able to and did see a fire on the roof of the building 
shortly before the building "\vas enYeloped in fla1nes, 
sho,ving that it \Yas 1nore probable that the fire was 
caused by the sign than from the inside of the building. 
,, .... ightn1an Y. i\Iountain Fuel Supply Company, 5 Utah 
~nd 373, 302 P ~nd 471. 
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Point 2. The trial court erred in refusing to subn1it 
the case to the jury on the question of Circumstantial 
Evidence. 
There had been other severe winds in the vicinity 
of the building before the 30th of October, 1959, and 
during the time that the defendant had been maintaining 
its sign on the building (It. 16). 'l~he windows of the 
building had been blown out three different times and 
the defendant knew or 'vith the exercise of ordinary 
care should have known of the probability of such 
storms. 
The transformers in the defendant's sign boosted 
the po,ver from 110 to 16,000 volts and created an in-
strumentality capable of starting the fire (R. 29). 
'fhere 'vere agents of the defendant's working on 
the sign the day and night before the fire, repairing 
changing or adjusting the sign ( R. 19) . 
The fire actually started on the roof of the building 
and there was a disturbance in the sign (R. 55). 
'!~here was a part of the sign hanging by \vhat ap-
peared to be electric 'vires the n1orning after the fire, 
'vhich would have rested on the roof had there been a 
roof there ( R. 22 and 95) . 
I~rom JA~fES , ... ROBERTSON, 39 U. 414, 
119 P. 1068: 
"A plaintiff suing for neg·ligence need merely 
sho'v a state of facts fron1 which the jury n1ay 
logically infer negligence, and, "rhere the jury 
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believes plaintiff's eYidence fro1n \vhich the infer-
ence of negligence Inay be deducted, the evidence 
ordinarily sustains a finding of negligence, 
though defendant disputes all of plaintiff's evi-
l , ' < ence. 
}_,roin BlTSSE \'". ~IURRA1,.. MEA'l, & LIVE-
S'rO('l\: CO~IP.l\.N1.,.., 45 Utah 596: 
''X o case should be taken from the jury unless 
it appears, as a matter of la,v, that no recovery 
can be had upon any view which c~n reasonably 
be dra,vn fron1 the facts 'vhich the evidence tends 
to establish. (Cain v. Gold ~fountain Mining 
Co., 71 Pac. (Mont.) 1004.) To hold otherwise 
'votild be to deprive a litigant of the right of 
trial by jury. (Nyback v. Lumber Co., 90 Fed., 
776.} 
and further from BUSSE\-... MURRAY MEAT & 
LI\_,.E STOCK CO., 45 utah 596: 
"''I'rue, negligence as well as how the accident 
occurred nuty be inferred from known or estab-
lished facts and circumstances. Such inference 
must, ho,veve,r, be based upon some known or 
established fact or facts and cannot be conjec-
tured or inferred from other inferences. In fail-
ing to sho'v negligence, we think this case comes 
squarely "~ithin the principle 'vhich controlled 
the case of Quinn v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 42 
lTtah 113; 129 Pac. 362; 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
328. See, also 3 Elliott on Evidence, Section 
:2503 . 
.. . . . 'I'he controlling question, therefore, is 
"·hat 'vere plaintiffs required to prove in order 
to n1ake out a prima facie case for the jury? 
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"'l"'he "Triter is not a'vare of any better state-
ment of the law in that regard than is contained 
in 1 Shear. & Redf. Neg. (Sixth ed.) section 
58, 'vhere the author states the rule in the follo,v-
ing language: 
"The plaintiff is not bound to prove more 
than enough to raise a fair presumption of 
negligence on the part of the defendant and 
of resulting injury to himself. Having done 
this, he is entitled to recover, unless the de-
fendant produces evidence sufficient to rebut 
this presumption. It has sometimes been held 
not sufficient for the plaintiff to establish a 
probability of the defendant's fault, but this 
is going too far. If the facts proved make it 
probable that the defendant violated his duty, 
it is for the jury to decide "~hether he did so or 
not. To hold otherwise would be to deny the 
value of circumstantial evidence. As already 
stated, the plaintiff is not bound to prove his 
case beyond a reasonable doubt; and, although 
the facts sho"rn must be 1nore consistent with 
the negligence of the defendant than with the 
absence of it~ they need not be inconsistent with 
any other hypothesis. It is well settled that 
evidence of negligence need not be direct and 
positive. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient. 
In the nature of the case, the plaintiff must 
labor under difficulties in proving the fact of 
negligence; and as that fact itself is a},yays 
a relative one. it is susceptible of proof by 
evidence of circumstances bearing more or less 
directly upon the fact of negligence; and as 
that fact itself is al,Yars a relative one. it is 
susceptible of proof by evidence of circtun-
stances bearing more or less directly upon the 
fact of negligence.. a kind of evidence which 
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tnight not be satisfactory in other classes of 
cases open to clearer proof. 'l.,his is on the 
general principle of the law of evidence which 
holds that to be sufficient or satisfactory evi-
dence "·hich satisfies an unprejudiced mind." 
~-.1\ e:treful reading of the foregoing statement 
of the la"· "·hich emanates from two of the ablest, 
as '"ell as the 1nost careful text-writers upon the 
subject, 'vill, \\'e think, convince anyone that the 
facts and circu1nstances of this case are not such 
that a court 'vould be justified to declare as 
matter of la"' that there is no substantial evidence 
upon which a jury could base a finding of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant in laying the 
t"·o tracks so close together. 
".r\.t most, the question of negligence may be 
said to be doubtful; and, where such is the case, 
it has becon1e elementary in this jurisdiction, as 
well as in many others, that the question is for 
the jury. n ,Johnson Y. Silver King Consol. Min-
ing Co. of Utah, 54 Utah 34. 
And from :\IORBY ,r. ROGERS, 122 U. 540, 
252 Pi 281, 1953: 
''}1-.,ather for death of 13 year old son, only 
eYidence hr defen.dant's drivers of the car. Boy 
on bike. "l t is not new or novel principle that 
acts of negligence may be proved by circum-
stances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly 
"·here the only eye witnesses are parties having 
an interest in the action, such circumstances are 
the only means by 'vhich certain facts may be 
discovered. In such cases it is proper that such 
circumstances should be evaluated by the jury 
in 'vhose province lies th~ power to believe or 
disbelieve the testimony and evidence, to observ-e 
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the demeanor of the witnesses, and then dra'v 
such reasonable conclusions from the whole rec-
ord as may be warranted. '~We are of the opinion 
that reasonable minds could find negligence on 
the part of the defendant from the evidence in 
the record. 'l.,he trial court did not err in letting 
the question of defendant's negligence go to the 
jury under the evidence." 
l~ro1n CORPL'S JURIS SJ~CONDCni, P. 243, 
-Page 1100: 
"Direct or positive negligence is not necessary 
but defendant's negJ.igence may be established 
by circumstantial evidence and by proof of facts 
fron1 which negligence may reasonably be in-
ferred ... '' That no other conclusion. can be 
fairly or reasonably drawn from them" seems to 
be the test.'' 
and A)I JUR., 38, 993, Paragraph 297: 
"Rejection of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
does not mean that negligence may not be estab-
lished by circumstantial eYidence as well as by 
direct evidence.'' 
Respectfully submitted, 
IIORAl'1.E J. KNO''rLTOX 
Attorney for Appellants 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
